



29 August 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Honorable Harold E. Stassen
Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament

SUBJECT : Comments on Department of Defense Outline Plan

1. I have examined the Department of Defense Outline Plan for implementation of an aerial and ground inspection system in first phase disarmament and have compared the basic concept with that of the Comprehensive Inspection Plan prepared by the Task Forces dated January, 1956.

2. The Department of Defense Outline Plan should serve the stated purpose "to provide an illustrative outline of the U. S. concept of operations for aerial and ground inspection in the first phase of disarmament." However, it is to be emphasized that it is "an illustrative outline" and that any technical working group developing any Annex to an agreement will require additional guidance and a great deal more detailed information.

3. The following specific comments may be worthy of note:

a. Assumption: The plan might well include assumptions relating to exchange and verification of blueprints; retention of a retaliatory posture, utilization of technical and scientific means for verification, abrogation in case of major violation, and similar reservations.

b. Paragraph 4, Organization: In outline the organization conforms to the concept envisaged in the Task Forces Comprehensive Plan, except that the scope and size is materially reduced.

c. Paragraph 5, Concept of the Operation: In general, a nuclear stalemate might deter the use of the nuclear weapons for mass destruction. In such case, an attack with conventional arms should not be excluded from consideration.

d. Ground Inspection: The Outline Plan provides for the major objective of some insurance against surprise attack but does not appear to deal with verification of compliance with disarmament agreements as envisaged in the Task Forces Comprehensive Plan. If initial agreements include nuclear, industrial or other

aspects in the first phase, consideration should be given to provision for verification. It is to be noted that in the Task Forces Comprehensive Plan verification of nuclear details was considered to be one of the major problems, involving very material personnel requirements.

e. Communications: The communications system should not depend in any way on communications which the Soviets can interrupt. I would consider therefore that the estimates for communications would be inadequate.

3. In summary, this Outline Plan should serve the stated purpose. No doubt the Comprehensive Plans prepared by the Department of Defense or the Task Forces can be made available to technical working groups if desirable.

L. K. TRUSCOTT, JR.
General, USA (Ret)

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